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MARYLAND'S DIMINISHED LONG-ARM JURISDICTION 
IN THE WAKE OF ZAVIANv. FOUDY 
Jeffrey J. Utermohlet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Zavian v. Foudy, 1 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland em-
braced an ultraconservative approach to extraterritorial personal juris-
diction in suits between agent and principal.2 Specifically, the court 
adopted a rule that an agent's acts in Maryland are attributed to her 
nonresident principal whom a third party sues,3 but such acts are not 
so attributed if the agent sues the principal.4 According to the court, 
when an agent sues her out-of-state principal, the agent's in-state acts 
do not count towards satisfYing the Maryland long-arm statute's "trans-
acting business" pron~ or establishing the necessary due process6 
t B.S., 1984, Journalism, University of Maryland at College Park; J.D., 1987, 
University of Baltimore School of Law. Law Clerk to the Honorable Harry 
A. Cole, Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1987-1989; Adjunct Professor, Legal 
Writing Program, University of Baltimore School of Law; Member, Law 
Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C. 
1. 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 (2000). 
2. See id. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770; see generally Green v. H & R Block, Inc., 355 
Md. 488,503-05, 517-20, 735 A.2d 1039, 1047-48, 1055-56 (1999) (providing 
an excellent discussion of "principal-agent relationships, such as between 
an attorney and his or her client"); accord Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-
36 (1991) (noting that "the word 'attorney' assumes an agency relation-
ship"). But see Perlman v. Martin, 332 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (declin-
ing to extend jurisdiction over a nonresident client in attorney's suit for 
fees because "a lawyer is an independent contractor and not his client's 
agent in any general sense"). 
3. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has shown no reluctance to attribute an 
agent's acts in Maryland to her nonresident principal whom a third party 
sues. See Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 659, 370 A.2d 551, 554 ( 1977) 
(sustaining jurisdiction where Kentucky defendant's agents, Maryland at-
torneys, engaged in six weeks of debt collection negotiations with the plain-
tiffin Maryland); Harris v. Arlen Props., Inc., 256 Md. 185, 196-97, 260 A.2d 
22, 28 (1969) (upholdingjurisdiction over a New York real estate developer 
that sent its "officers and agents" to Maryland to scout for locations, apply 
for a building permit, negotiate an easement, and arrange for the installa-
tion of storm drains); Novack v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n, 247 Md. 350, 357, 231 
A.2d 22, 26 (1967) (sustainingjurisdiction over a California-based racetrack 
sponsor that sent its regularly employed agent into Maryland on five occa-
sions to inspect and safety-certify the racetrack where the injuries 
occurred). 
4. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770. 
5. Maryland's long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part: "A court may exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or fry an agent. (1) 
Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the 
1 
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"minimum contacts.''7 This article posits that the Zavian court went 
astray in following New York's Nonattribution Rule8 and dismissing a 
Maryland attorney's action against her nonresident clients for unpaid 
legal fees. 
In Zavian, a case of first impression,9 Maryland's intermediate ap-
pellate court considered whether the Maryland contacts of three non-
resident professional soccer players justified exercise of long-arm 
personal jurisdiction. In the attorney's suit for unpaid legal fees, the 
soccer player's contacts included retaining a Maryland attorney's ser-
vices and making repeated business-related appearances in Mary-
land.10 The three clients, who were star members of the United States 
Women's National Soccer Team and domiciled in different states, 11 
initiated contact with the plaintiff, Maryland lawyer Ellen Zavian, in 
late Summer 1996,12 and asked her to become their agent. 13 Each 
player signed a Personal Management Agreement under which Ms. 
Zavian acted as their exclusive agent to negotiate footwear endorse-
ment deals14 and provide ancillary legal services. 15 All communica-
tions between Zavian and her clients were by telephone, fax, or mail. 16 
During the subsequent nine months, Zavian, from her law office in 
Columbia, Maryland, successfully negotiated lucrative17 endorsement 
contracts for Foudy, Overbeck, and Lilly with companies including 
State." Mo. CoDE ANN., CTs. & Juo. PROc. § 6-103(b) (Supp. 2001) (em-
phasis added). In 1964, the Maryland legislature enacted the long-ann stat-
ute to ensure a "comprehensive expansion of the judicial jurisdiction of the 
State of Maryland." Groom v. Margolis, 257 Md. 691, 702, 265 A.2d 249, 
254 (1970). The "transacting business" prong was modeled after section 
l.03(a)(1) of the 1962 Uniform Interstate and International Procedures 
Act. /d. The drafters of the Uniform Act intended that the "transacting 
business" prong be given an "expansive interpretation." UN1F. INTERSTATE 
& INT'L PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03 cmt. at 362, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1986). 
6. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ l. 
7. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
9. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 693, 747 A.2d at 767. 
10. /d. at 692-702, 747 A.2d at 766-72. See infra note 195 and accompanying 
text. 
11. Julie Foudy lived in California, Carla Overbeck lived in North Carolina, and 
Kristine Lilly lived in Connecticut. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691-92, 747 
A.2d at 765-66. 
12. Brief for Appellant at 4, 7 & 10, Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 
A.2d 764 (2000) (No. 00074). Julie Foudy, on behalf of her teammates, 
had previously retained Ellen Zavian in 1995 for representation in a labor 
dispute. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 765-66. 
13. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766. 
14. /d. 
15. Brief for Appellant at 6, 8, & 11; Record Extract at 24-28, 46-59, & 81-126, 
Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 (2000) (No. 00074). 
16. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766. 
17. Record at 8-23, 33-45, 63-80. 
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Reebok, Fila, and Adidas, 18 and the players sent legal fee payments to 
Zavian' s office in Maryland. 19 In July 1997, Zavian terminated each 
Personal Management Agreement in order to devote her attention to 
solely representing the United States Women's National Soccer 
Team.20 Zavian sent final bills to the three clients, but after each re-
fused to pay21 she filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County.22 The trial court granted the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
based on lack of personal jurisdiction,23 and Zavian appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.24 In holding that the soccer 
players' attorney-client relationship with a Maryland lawyer, together 
with their repeated business-related appearances in Maryland, did not 
subject them to long-arm jurisdiction, the Zavian court adopted New 





23. !d. In federal practice, lack of personal jurisdiction will not always lead to 
dismissal of the action; instead of dismissal, the court may transfer the case 
to a forum where jurisdiction lies. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Servidone Constr. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1496, 1508 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding 
that a federal court has the power to transfer an action "notwithstanding 
that it lacks personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants"). Transfer 
may save a plaintiff's cause of action otherwise time-barred by limitations in 
the alternative forum. See, e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465 
(1962) (observing that dismissal would have resulted in the loss of a sub-
stantial part of the cause of action). However, a court generally will not 
transfer a case if it finds that the plaintiff's attorney "could have reasonably 
foreseen when they brought their claims that the Maryland district court 
lacked personal jurisdiction." Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 
1202 (4th Cir. 1993). 
24. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766. The Zavian court considered 
whether the nonresident defendants had sufficient contacts with Maryland 
to warrant an exercise of "specific" jurisdiction. !d. at 694, 747 A.2d at 767. 
"Specific jurisdiction," which requires that the defendant have "minimum 
contacts" with the forum, is exercisable over a nonresident when the suit 
arises out of or relates to the contacts; "general jurisdiction," which re-
quires that the defendant have "continuous and systematic" contacts with 
the forum, is exercisable over a nonresident when the suit does not arise 
out of or relate to the defendant's contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8 & 9 (1984); see also Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 422-23, 540 A.2d 482, 486-87 (1988) 
(discussing "general jurisdiction"). The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
stated in Presbyterian University Hospital v. Wilson: 
[W]here a defendant may not have sufficient contacts to support 
general jurisdiction, a trial judge need not segregate factors tend-
ing to support general jurisdiction from those supporting specific 
jurisdiction. Rather, the court may utilize factors relevant to gen-
eral jurisdiction in making a determination regarding the propriety 
of the forum's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant. 
337 Md. 541, 551 n.2, 654 A.2d 1324, 1330 n.2 (1995). 
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York's "Nonattribution Rule"25 and affirmed the circuit court's dismis-
sal of the lawsuit. 26 
Part II of this Article traces the history of personal jurisdiction juris-
prudence and explains how most states' long-arm statutes, including 
Maryland's, seek to extend personal jurisdiction to the maximum ex-
tent permitted by due process.27 Part III details the strong criticism 
that New York's Nonattribution Rule has received from courts and 
commentators.28 It posits that the Zavian court went astray in adopt-
ing the Nonattribution Rule because the court did not appreciate the 
fundamental difference between Maryland's and New York's long-arm 
statutes: New York's ultraconservative approach to extraterritorial ju-
risdiction clashes with Maryland's historical commitment to extend its 
personal jurisdiction to the outermost constitutionallimits.29 Part III 
also discusses the flawed underpinnings of the Nonattribution Rule 
and describes why the cases used to justifY the Rule form a poor foun-
dation for a doctrine turning on agency-based distinctions. 30 Part IV 
analyzes why, contrary to Zavian's holding, the facts warranted exer-
cise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under Maryland's long-arm statute 
and the analytical roadmap of International Shoe and its progeny.31 
This Article concludes by calling on the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
to resolve the conflict between the Maryland federal district court's 
rejection of the Nonattribution Rule and the Maryland intermediate 
appellate court's embrace of the Rule.32 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURSIDICTION LAW 
A. Pennoyer v. Neff 
The United States Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence originated in the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff.33 According 
25. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770. 
26. Id. at 702, 747 A.2d at 772. 
27. See infra Part II. 
28. See infra Part III. 
29. See infra Part III. 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. See infra Part IV. 
32. See infra Part V. 
33. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennayer, both parties claimed title to a piece of real 
estate in Oregon. Id. at 719. Pennoyer asserted title under a sheriffs deed 
resulting from the sheriff's sale of tlle property to Pennoyer to collect on a 
judgment entered in Oregon against Neff, a nonresident of Oregon, in 
favor of Neffs former attorney, Mitchell, for legal fees Neff owed. I d. The 
Supreme Court determined that Mitchell's judgment was invalid and, 
therefore, Pennoyer obtained no title by the sheriff's unauthorized sale of 
the property because in the underlying action of Mitchell v. Neff, Neff had 
not been personally served with process within Oregon; rather, the Oregon 
court had asserted personal jurisdiction over the nonresident based merely 
on constructive service by publication in Oregon. Id. at 719-20, 734. The 
Pennayer Court reasoned that service by publication would, in the great ma-
jority of cases, never be seen by a nonresident defendant, and that 
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to Pennoyer, " [ t] he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted 
by the territorial limits ofthe State in which it is established."34 There-
fore, the Court laid down principles that "every State possesses exclu-
sive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its 
territory"35 and, conversely, "that no State can exercise direct jurisdic-
tion and authority over persons and property without its territory. "36 
The Pennoyer decision served another key function as it placed in per-
sonam jurisdictional analysis squarely under the aegis of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause37 and provided support for 
the Court's subsequent declaration that jurisdiction based on "physi-
cal presence" ipso facto satisfies due process.38 Mter Pennoyer, inter-
state commerce-promoting innovations in transportation and 
communication created a vastly different world, and the Supreme 
Court responded to those changes in the granddaddy of all modern 







"(j]udgments for all sorts of claims upon contracts and for torts, real or 
pretended" could thus fraudulently be obtained in ex parte proceedings 
against nonresidents. Id. at 726. To assure "proper protection to citizens of 
other States," the Court held that due process required that a court could 
obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only by personal service of 
process within the forum state, or by his voluntary appearance. Id. at 726, 
733. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court o[Califomia, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), 
in which the Supreme Court upheld "tag' jurisdiction over a nonresident 
individual solely because he was served with process while visiting in the 
forum state. Id. at 619. 
Pennayer, 95 U.S. at 720. 
Id. at 722. 
I d. 
Id. at 733; see also supra note 6. 
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619. However, the Supreme Court cautioned, "[i]t 
goes too far to say ... that a State lacks jurisdiction over an individual 
unless the litigation arises out of his activities in the State." Id. at 620. 
326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court upheld 
Washington's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a Missouri-based 
shoe company sued by the State of Washington for contributions owed to 
that State's unemployment compensation fund. Id. at 320-21. The debt 
arose from the in-state presence of eleven to thirteen of the company's 
salesmen, each of whom operated under the direct supervision and control 
of managers at the home office in Missouri. Id. at 313. By virtue of their 
Washington sales activities, the Court noted that the shoe company had 
"received the benefits and protections of the laws of the state, including the 
right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights." Id. at 320. 
Reciprocally, conducting such in-state activities "may give rise to obliga-
tions, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the 
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the [defendant] to 
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be 
said to be undue." I d. at 319. In essence, the International Shoe Court recog-
nized a quid pro quo whereby a nonresident subjects itself to personal juris-
diction in exchange for the privilege of conducting in-state activities, 
provided the cause of action arises from those activities. Id. at 319-20. 
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B. International Shoe v. Washington 
In recognizing the diminishing utility of "physical presence," the 
International Shoe Court formulated a completely new, and greatly ex-
panded, test for constitutionally permissible extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, requiring only that the nondomiciliary have "certain minimum 
contacts"40 with a forum such that exercising jurisdiction does not of-
fend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."41 
To take advantage of International Shoe's expanded constitutional 
concept of in personam jurisdiction, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia enacted long-arm statutes42 enabling a court to hale a non-
resident into the forum to defend a lawsuit.43 For example, the long-
arm provision considered in Zavian provides, in pertinent part: "A 
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or 
by an agent . .. [t]ransacts any business or performs any character of 
work or service in the State."44 However, not all long-arm statutes are 
created equal: the overwhelming majority of states, including Mary-
40. !d. at 316. 
41. !d. 
42. Although state laws, long-arm statutes may be relied on in federal court as 
well as state court. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k). 
43. See jAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE§ 108.60[1] (3d 
ed. 1997) (defining "long-arm statute" as the exercise of "statutory jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants"). 
44. Mo. ConE ANN., CTs. &Jun. PRoc. § 6-103(b) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis ad-
ded). Maryland's long-arm statute, in its entirety, provides: 
!d. 
(a) Condition.-If jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon 
this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action arising from 
any act enumerated in this section. 
(b) In generaL-A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
person, who directly or by an agent: (1) Transacts any business or 
performs any character of work or service in the State; (2) Con-
tracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in 
the State; (3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omis-
sion in the State; ( 4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside 
of the State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly 
does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, 
food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the 
State; (5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the 
State; or (6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any 
person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, 
executed, or to be performed within the State at the time the con-
tract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing. 
(c) Applicability to computer information and computer pro-
grams-(l)(i) In this subsection the following terms have the 
meanings indicated. (ii) "Computerinformation" has the meaning 
stated in § 22-102 of the Commercial Law Article. (iii) "Computer 
program" has the meaning stated in § 22-102 of the Commercial 
Law Article. (2) The provisions of this section apply to computer 
information and computer programs in the same manner as they 
apply to goods and services. 
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land, extend personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the 
due process decisions of the Supreme Court. 45 On the other hand, a 
small minority of states implement their long-arm authority more nar-
rowly than due process allows.46 For instance, New York clings to an 
anachronistic approach47 best described as "half-way between Pennoyer 
and International Shoe."48 The Nonattribution Rule epitomizes New 
York's conservative approach.49 
III. THE NONATTRIBUTION RULE 
Courts and commentators from New York to Maryland have 
strongly criticized the Nonattribution Rule's arbitrary dichotomy, and 
no court has ever fashioned a rational basis to support it. 
A. Criticism of the Rule in New Yom and Maryland 
In Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc.,50 the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland summarized the Nonattribution 
Rule, stating: 
The New York courts permit the exercise of personal juris-
diction over a nonresident who has acted in the state 
through an agent, when the nonresident is sued by a third 
party. When it is the agent suing the nonresident, those 
courts will not attribute the agent's in-state acts to the non-
resident, even if a classic agency relationship is involved. 5 1 
From the courts of New York to those of Maryland, the Nonattribu-
tion Rule has sustained potent criticism. In Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 5 2 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disparaged the 
Nonattribution Rule's dichotomy, whereby an agent's in-state activities 
are imputed to his nonresident principal whom a third party sues, 53 
but such activities are not so imputed if the agent sues the principal: 
45. See infra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Camelback Ski Corp. v. 
Behning, 307 Md. 270, 274, 513 A.2d 874, 876 (1986) (describing the legis-
lative purpose behind enactment of Maryland's long-arm statute as "the ex-
pansion of judicial jurisdiction up to but not beyond the outermost limits 
permitted in this area by the due process decisions of the Supreme Court"). 
46. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
47. See generally Ingraham v. Carroll, 687 N.E.2d 1293, 1299-300 (N.Y. 1997) 
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (decrying New York's "rigid" approach to extra-
territorial jurisdiction as "not reflect[ing] a progressive reassessment as to 
where the law is or ought to be, based on this flexible springboard of long-
arm jurisdiction"). 
48. Recent Decision, jurisdiction-In Personam Over Non-Domiciliaries-Transact-
ing Business Within the State Under 302(a)(l), 34 BROOK. L. REv. 148, 152 
(1968); see also infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
49. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001). 
50. 521 F. Supp. 130 (D. Md. 1981). 
51. Id. at 141. 
52. 504 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1974). 
53. Id. at 1065 n.l. 
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"Conceptually, it would not seem to be a supportable distinction and 
this is so noted by Dean McLaughlin."54 Joseph McLaughlin, then 
Dean of Fordham Law School and an acknowledged "outstanding au-
thority"55 on New York procedural law, characterized the adoption of 
the Nonattribution Rule as "a regrettable turn in the tortuous road" of 
New York's long-arm statute. 56 The scholar cogently reasoned: 
If the acts of a true agent may be imputed to his foreign prin-
cipal when the suit is between a third party, who dealt with 
the agent, and the principal, there is no analytical reason 
why the acts of the agent cannot similarly be attributed when 
the suit is between the agent and the principal.57 
Although some jurists in New York have followed the Nonattribu-
tion Rule,58 other courts in New York and other jurisdictions have 
not. 59 For example, in Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc.,60 Maryland's 
54. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 
F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the Nonattribution Rule has re-
ceived "strong criticism"). 
55. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 335 N.Y.S.2d llO, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 
56. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney Supp. 1973-1974) (referring to the Practice 
Commentaries by Joseph M. McLaughlin in the Cumulative Annual Pocket 
Part). 
57. Id. 
58. See, e.g., Stein v. Microelectronic Packaging, Inc., 98 Civ. 8952 (MBM), 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11375, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.July 21, 1999). "[I]n a suit between 
an agent and his out-of-state principal, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over the defendant-principal based on the plaintiff-agent's own activities 
within the state." /d. (citations omitted). 
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 60, 242 and 
accompanying text. Although the Zavian opinion did not mention it, 
courts sitting in New York often have asserted jurisdiction over an out-of-
state client sued by a New York lawyer for legal fees, provided the nonresi-
dent has visited the lawyer or substantially participated in the activities of 
the lawyer in New York. See Fly, Shuebruk, Gaguine, Boros & Braun v. Mar-
cus, 94 Civ. 543 (KTD), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2910, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 
1996) (upholding NewYork's long-arm where NewYork law firm's contract 
to provide legal services to the nonresident defendant "was entered into 
and largely performed in New York and [ ] the defendant repeatedly met 
with the plaintiff in New York"); Carro, Span bock, Kaster, & Cuiffo v. Rin-
zler, No. 88 Civ. 5280 (MJL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1212, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 30, 1991) (upholding jurisdiction based on "the defendants' act of re-
taining a New York law firm to defend it in a suit in New York"); Reiner v. 
Durand, 602 F. Supp. 849, 851-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sustaining jurisdiction 
based on defendant's "various visits to and communications with the attor-
neys in New York" and also noting, "New York courts are divided over the 
question of whether the retainer of an attorney in New York by an out of 
state party is a transaction of business within the state so that jurisdiction 
can be exercised over the non-resident"); Jecies v. Matsuda, 503 F. Supp. 
580, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding jurisdiction in suit for unpaid legal 
fees because cause of action arose out of defendants' alleged retainer of 
plaintiff at plaintiff's New York law office); Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston 
& Rosen, P.C. v. Shreve City Apartments, Ltd., 543 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981 (App. 
Div. 1989) (sustaining jurisdiction based on defendants' retention of New 
York law firm to provide representation in New York bankruptcy case, ex-
2001] Zavian v. Foudy 9 
federal court flatly rejected the Nonattribution Rule after noting that 
the Second Circuit had also "questioned its soundness."61 In Snyder, a 
Maryland-based marketer of men's clothing solicited purchase orders 
for many years from customer accounts in Maryland and other states 
for clothing products of New York and North Carolina-based Hamp-
ton, from whom it received commission checks drawn on North Caro-
lina and New York banks.62 Eventually, Snyder sued Hampton for 
breach of contract for failure to pay commissions. 63 In sustaining 
long-arm jurisdiction over Hampton, the Maryland federal district 
court held that "[c]ertain of the plaintiff's acts in Maryland can be 
attributed to Hampton for jurisdictional purposes."64 In doing so, the 
court expressly repudiated New York's Nonattribution Rule. 65 
tensive communications between the parties, and payments sent by defend-
ants into New York); Elman v. Belson, 302 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (App. Div. 
1969) (sustaining jurisdiction over Illinois resident in action for attorney 
fees because defendant's Illinois attorneys had come to New York to retain 
New York attorneys to enforce Illinois judgments in New York, and subse-
quently made "several trips to New York, during which they participated in 
the efforts" to collect on the judgments); see also Polish v. Threshold Tech. 
Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (explaining that "plaintiff's 
claim that he rendered legal services to the defendants in New York estab-
lishes a sufficient nexus for jurisdiction"); Mayer v. Goldhaber, 313 N .Y.S.2d 
87, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (upholding jurisdiction because "[t]he retainer by 
defendants of plaintiff for the purpose of legal representation in [New 
York] is a purposeful transaction of business within [New York]"). But cf. 
Amins v. Life Support Med. Equip. Co., 373 F. Supp. 654, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 
1974) (noting that despite isolated meetings between the parties in New 
York, it was not "unreasonable or unfair" to deny a New York forum to a 
New York attorney who had "sought out and accepted in Massachusetts em-
ployment by a small Massachusetts concern"). New York courts have gener-
ally denied jurisdiction where the nonresident client's only contacts with 
New York have been activities performed there by his attorney. See Emmet, 
Marvin & Martin v. Maybrook, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3105 (MGC), 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16753, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990) (deeming services per-
formed by an attorney in New York an insufficient basis for jurisdiction 
where defendant did not come to New York to request plaintiff's legal ser-
vices or undertake any other purposeful activity in New York); Haar v. Ar-
mendaris Corp., 294 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that services 
performed by a nonresident attorney in New York, in the absence of in-state 
acts by the client, are an insufficient basis to assert jurisdiction in an action 
for legal fees); Winick v.Jackson, 268 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (stating 
that a nondomiciliary's hiring of a New York attorney for representation in 
a New York legal proceeding does not constitute "doing business" in New 
York). 
60. 521 F. Supp. 130 (D. Md. 1981). 
61. /d. at 142 n.IO. 
62. /d. at 133-36. 
63. /d. at 133. 
64. /d. at 141. 
65. /d. at 141-42. The Snyder court observed that the Nonattribution Rule has 
been criticized by New York commentators, see, for example, McLaughlin, 
Practice Commentary, New York Civil Practice Law and Rule 302 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1975), and is inconsistent with the conclusion reached by the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1369 
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In contrast to the well-reasoned criticism of the Nonattribution 
Rule by the Second Circuit, Maryland's federal district court, and the 
eminent New York scholar, Dean Joseph McLaughlin, no court or 
commentator has yet advanced a rational basis to support the Nonat-
tribution Rule's arbitrary dichotomy. 
B. Fundamental Differences in the Reach of the Long-Arm in New York and 
Maryland 
In addition to the Nonattribution Rule's status as a "regrettable"66 
doctrine supported by "no analytical reasoning,"67 another good rea-
son for Maryland courts not to rely on New York precedent to support 
a denial of long-arm jurisdiction is that Maryland, like forty-two other 
states and the District of Columbia, extends its extraterritorial per-
sonal jurisdiction to the "full extent" authorized by the Due Process 
Clause,68 but New York, like a small minority of only six other states, 
(D.C. 1978). Writing for the court in Rnse, Judge Ferren first distinguished 
Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 
355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976), which held that the in-state acts of an "indepen-
dent contractor" could not be attributed to the nonresident for jurisdic-
tional purposes. Rnse, 394 A.2d 1368, 1369 (D.C. 1978) (distinguishing 
Envtl. Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 
(D.C. 1976)). Judge Ferren reasoned that due process would not permit 
such attribution because "[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement 
of a contact with the forum State." /d. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In contrast, an agency rela-
tionship that contemplates some measure of control over the forum state 
actor "results in 'the defendant's purposeful avail [ing] itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum state.'" /d. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). The Snyder "court [found] Judge Fer-
ren's reasoning in Rnse to be more persuasive than that employed by the 
New York courts, and therefore decline[d] to follow the nonattribution 
rule of Haar." Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 142. 
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Maggos v. Helm, No. 98-
15751, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13244, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 1999) ("Ha-
waii's long-arm statute allows a court to assert in personam jurisdiction over 
a defendant to the extent permitted by the due process clause."); Davis v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The Mon-
tana Supreme Court has interpreted the Montana long-arm statute to per-
mit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the 
maximum extent permitted by federal due process."); In re Celotex Corp. v. 
Rapid Am. Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the West 
Virginia long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of due pro-
cess ... "); Commercial Diving Servs. v. Vice, No-00-59-BH-C, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7671, at *3 (S.D. Ala. May 24, 2000) ("The Alabama Supreme Court 
has interpreted Alabama's 'Long Arm Statute,' Alabama Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 4.2, to extend the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts to the permissi-
ble limits of due process."); Omniken, Inc. v. Shepherd Tissue, Inc., No. 98-
5269, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5268, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2000) (stating that 
a court applying Pennsylania's long-arm statute "may exercise personal ju-
risdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution"); Pkware, Inc. v. 
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Meade, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (noting that the Wiscon-
sin long-arm statute "is to be liberally construed in favor of exercising juris-
diction and is intended to confer jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due 
process"); Afflerbach v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (D. 
Wyo. 1998) (stating that the Wyoming long-arm statute "extends Wyoming 
court's jurisdiction to the limits of the due process clause"); Albertson's 
Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Civ. No. 9Ml398-S-BLW, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4554, at *7 (D. Idaho 1997) ("Because the Idaho long-arm 
statute exercises all jurisdiction consistent with due process, the test be-
comes simply whether personal jurisdiction over the defendants comports 
with due process."); Cramerv. Wade, 985 P.2d 467,471 (Alaska 1999) (stat-
ing that Alaska's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction "'to the maximum 
extent permitted by due process under the federal constitution'"); DeMont 
v. DeFrantz, No.2 CA-CVA 98-0038, 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 163, at *5 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1999) ("Rule 4.2(a) Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., authorizes 
long-arm )urisdiction over a nonresident litigant to the maximum extent 
allowed by the federal constitution."'); John Norrell Arms, Inc. v. Higgins, 
962 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ark. 1998) (quoting ARK. ConE ANN. § 1&4-101 (B) 
(Michie Supp. 1997): "The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdic-
tion of all persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maxi-
mum extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.")); Stone v. Texas, 90 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 657, 659 (Ct. App. 1999) ("California's long-arm statute permits 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis not inconsis-
tent with the federal or state constitutions."); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Equitas 
Ltd., 987 P.2d 954, 957 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) ("In enacting the long-arm 
statute, the General Assembly intended to extend the jurisdiction of Colo-
rado courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clauses of the 
United States and Colorado Constitutions, pursuant to the minimum con-
tacts requirements of International Shoe."); Friedman v. Alcatel Alsthom, 752 
A.2d 544, 549 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Delaware courts have construed the long-
arm statute very broadly in order 'to confer jurisdiction to the maximum 
extent possible under the Due Process Clause.'"); Shoppers Food Ware-
house v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 325 (D.C. 2000) ("Congress intended the 
District's long-arm statute, like the corresponding statutes in Maryland and 
Virginia, to be coextensive in reach with the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion permitted by the due process clause."); Galindo v. Lanier Worldwide, 
Inc., 526 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Bradlee Mgmt. 
Servs. v. Cassells, 292 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. App. 1982) and stating that "the pol-
icy of [Georgia's] Long Arm Statute is to exercise jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due 
process")); State ex rel. Miller v. Grodzinsky, 571 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1997) 
("Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2 provides for the broadest expanse of 
personal jurisdiction consistent with due process."); St. Francis Mercantile 
Equity Exch., Inc. v. Newton, 996 P.2d 365, 368 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("Kan-
sas appellate courts have consistently found that the Kansas long-arm stat-
ute is to be liberally construed to assert personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); 
Davis:Johnson v. Parmelee, 18 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (stating 
that Kentucky's long-arm statute "permits the courts 'to reach to the full 
constitutional limits of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants.'"); Ruckstuhl v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., 731 
So. 2d 881, 885 (La. 1999) (stating that Louisiana's long-arm statute allows 
"Louisiana courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident de-
fendants to the fullest extent allowed by the United States Constitution"); 
Dorf v. Complastik Corp., 735 A.2d 984 (Me. 1999) ("By express language 
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of the [Maine] long-arm statute, the courts must find personal jurisdiction 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution."); Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329 Md. 112, 128 
n.7, 617 A.2d 1057, 1064 n.7 (1993) ("As this Court has repeatedly stated, 
the purpose of the Maryland Long Arm Statute is to permit a Maryland 
court to exercise jurisdiction over the person to the full extent authorized 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution."); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 553 
(Mass. 1994) ("[T]he Massachusetts long-arm statute 'functions as "an as-
sertion of jurisdiction over the person to the limits allowed by the Constitu-
tion of the United States."'"); Green v. Wilson, 565 N.W.2d 813, 825 n.12 
(Mich. 1997) ("'[The long-arm statute] was intended to give Michigan 
courts the full extent of power possible to gain personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants as is consistent with the principles of due pro-
cess."') (alteration in original) (quoting Kriko v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 
N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1984)); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 
670, 672 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the Minnesota long-arm stat-
ute "permits courts to assert jurisdiction over defendants to the extent that 
federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow"); State ex rel. 
K-Mart Corp. v. Bolliger, 986 S.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Mo. 1999) ("This Court 
has determined that the legislative intent of the Missouri General Assembly 
in passing [the long-arm statute] 'was to extend the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state over nonresident defendants to the extent permissible under 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of 
the United States."'); Castle Rose, Inc. v. Phila. Bar & Grill of Ariz., Inc., 
576 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Neb. 1998) ("Nebraska's long-arm statute ... ex-
pressly extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any con-
tact with or maintaining any relation with Nebraska as far as the U.S. 
Constitution permits .... "); Baker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 999 P.2d 
1020, 1023 (Nev. 2000) ("Nevada's long-arm statute ... reaches the limits 
of due process set by the United States Constitution."); South Down Recrea-
tion Ass'n v. Moran, 686 A.2d 314, 316 (N.H. 1996) ("[W]e construe our 
statutes providing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents 'to the full con-
stitutional limit .... "'); F.F. v. G.A.D.R., 750 A.2d 786, 789 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2000) (stating that New Jersey's "long arm jurisdictional rule is 
coextensive with constitutional due process jurisdictional limits"); Tercero 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, 980 P.2d 77, 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1999) (noting that New Mexico's long-arm "statute extends the jurisdic-
tional reach of New Mexico courts as far as constitutionally permissible"); 
Saxon v. Smith, 479 S.E.2d 788, 794 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) ("Under [North 
Carolina's] 'long arm' statute, North Carolina courts may obtain personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the full extent permitted by 
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution."); Auction Ef-
fertz, Ltd. v. Schecher, 611 N.W.2d 173, 176 (N.D. 2000) (stating that 
North Dakota's long-arm provision was "'designed to permit the state 
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by 
due process'") (quoting Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 
234 N.W.2d 250, 255 (N.D. 1975)); Ferrell v. Prairie Int'l Trucks, Inc., 935 
P.2d 286, 288 (Okla. 1997) ("Oklahoma's long-arm statute extends the ju-
risdiction of its courts over non-residents to the outer-limits permitted by 
the Oklahoma Constitution and the United States Constitution."); Suther-
land v. Brennan, 901 P.2d 240,244-45 (Or. 1995) ("'[A]n Oregon court has 
jurisdiction to the limits of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; 
those limits are "an issue of federal law to be decided pursuant to the con-
trolling decisions of the United States Supreme Court."'"); Porter v. Porter, 
684 A.2d 259, 261 (R.I. 1996) (Rhode Island's long-arm statute confers on 
its courts ·~urisdiction over persons up to federal constitutional due process 
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does not.69 The limited reach of New York's long-arm statute renders 
limits"); Meyer v. Paschal, 498 S.E.2d 635, 638 (S.C. 1998) ("South Carolina 
enacted its version of the long-arm statute in 1966 and it has been inter-
preted to extend to the outer limits of the due process clause."); Vending v. 
Kraft, 161 N.W.2d 29, 34 (S.D. 1968) (holding that South Dakota applies its 
long-arm statute to the fullest extent permissible under due process); Mfrs. 
Consolidation Serv. v. Rodell, 42 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that Tennessee's long-arm statute "authorizes the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process"); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 
925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (noting that the Texas long-arm statute 
reaches "'as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process 
will allow'") (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English 
China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) ); Starways, Inc. v. 
Curry, 980 P.2d 204, 206 (Utah 1999) ("[T]he Utah long-arm statute 'must 
be extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law.'"); Brown 
v. Cal Dykstra Equip. Co., 740 A.2d 793, 794 (Vt. 1999) (stating that the 
Vermont long-arm statute" 'reflects a clear policy to assert jurisdiction over 
individual defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process 
Clause"') (quoting N. Aircraft v. Reed, 572 A.2d 1382, 1385 (Vt. 1990)); 
Glumina Bank v. D.C. Diamond Corp., 527 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Va. 2000) 
("'The function of [Virginia's] long-arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over 
nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in Virginia, to the 
extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the 
United States.'") (quoting Nan Ya Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis, 337 
S.E.2d 388, 391 (Va. 1989)); Nagy v. Williams, No. 23895-1-11, 1999 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 2071, at *3-*4 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1999) (stating that 
Washington's long-arm statute "is meant to be coextensive with the limits of 
federal due process"). 
69. New York is one of only seven jurisdictions (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Mississippi and New York) that do not interpret their long-
arm statute as extending to the full extent of constitutional authority. See 
Anderson v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(noting that New York's long-arm statute "'does not extend New York's 
long-arm jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution'") 
(quoting Levisohn, Lerner, Berger & Langsam v. Med. Taping Sys., 10 F. 
Supp. 2d 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)); Thomason v. Chern. Bank, 661 A.2d 
595,602 (Conn. 1995) ("If the legislature had meant to allow our courts to 
exercise the full extent of constitutionally permissible long arm jurisdic-
tion, it could have done so explicitly."); Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868, 
869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("Generally speaking, Florida's long-arm stat-
utes are of a class that requires more activities or contacts to allow service of 
process than are currently required by the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court."); Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1314 (Ill. 1990) 
("Illinois' long-arm statute ... may well restrict the power that the courts of 
this State have to bring nonresidents before them to a greater extent than 
do the Federal due process clause and the 'minimum contacts' standard 
developed over the years by the Supreme Court."). The Appellate Court of 
Illinois has held that: 
Illinois courts are not to consider only the literal meaning of the 
text of the long-arm statute or the evolving federal constitutional 
standards of due process; they must consider the constraints im-
posed by the Illinois Constitution's guarantee of due process .... 
Under the Illinois constitutional standard, jurisdiction is to be as-
serted "only when it is fair,just, and reasonable to require a nonres-
ident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the 
quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or 
which affect interests located in Illinois." ... The focus is on the 
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New York precedent denying jurisdiction inapposite in full-extent 
states such as Maryland. As one commentator noted, jurisdictions mis-
takenly adopt New York precedent without taking note of the limita-
tions of New York's law, specifically, that New York's jurisdictional 
statute does not go to the limits of the Constitution, and that New 
York law additionally requires the defendant's physical presence.70 
From this it follows that New York case law denying long-arm jurisdic-
tion is readily distinguishable in any state, such as Maryland, whose 
long-arm statute either goes to the constitutional limits or simply does 
not require physical presence in the state. 71 
The broad reach of Maryland's current long-arm law stands out in 




defendant's activities within the forum state, not those of the 
plaintiff. 
Mellon First United Leasing v. Hansen, 705 N.E.2d 121, 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1998); see also Anthem Ins. Cos. Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 
1227, 1232 (Ind. 2000) (rejecting the proposition that the Indiana long-
arm statute was "intended to be coextensive with the limits of personal juris-
diction under the Due Process Clause"); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 
F.3d 863, 869 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Mississippi's long-arm statute is not co-
extensive with due process."); Goldstein v. Christiansen, 638 N.E.2d 541, 
545 n.1 (Ohio 1994) (noting that "Ohio has not extended long-arm juris-
diction to the limits of due process"). 
Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. 
REv. 565, 577-78 (1999). 
!d.; see also infra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing that Maryland's 
long-arm statute does not require the defendant's physical presence in the 
state); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing that Maryland's 
long-arm statute extends to the "outermost" constitutional limits). Al-
though courts have consistently interpreted the "transacting business" 
prong of the Maryland long-arm statute as extending to the full extent per-
mitted by due process, several courts applying Maryland law have ques-
tioned whether the "tortious injury" prongs of the statute reach the limits 
of due process. See Mo ConE ANN., CTs. & Jun. PROC. §§ 6-103(b)(3), 6-
103(b) (4) (Supp. 2001); Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 
136 (D. Md. 1981) (questioning whether Maryland's long-arm statute's sub-
sections (b) (3) and (b) (4) reach the full extent permitted by due process, 
but noting that federal courts have analyzed "transacting business" cases 
"under the Due Process standards developed by the Supreme Court"); 
Craig v. Gen. Fin. Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (D. Md. 1980) (maintain-
ing that sections 6-103(b) (3) and (b) (4) of Maryland's long-arm statute are 
not "coterminous with due process"); see generally Recent Decision, The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Holds Occasional Interstate Telephone Calls Insuffi-
cient to Sustain Personal jurisdiction try a Maryland Court, 56 Mo. L. REv. 1147, 
1151 (1997) (noting federal and Maryland state courts' discord over 
whether the tortious injury prongs of Maryland's long-arm statute authorize 
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process). But see Stover v. 
O'Connell Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 983 (1996) (applying sections 6-103(b)(3) and (b)(4) and noting that 
the Maryland long-arm statute is "coterminous with the limits of the Due 
Process Clause"). 
Maryland's federal district court discussed article 23, section 92(d) in Ben-
nett v. Computers Intercontinental, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Md. 
1974), stating: 
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tions to suit in Maryland on causes of action arising out of contracts 
"made"73 within this State. The modern "transaction of business" con-
cept extended such jurisdiction considerably:74 it applies to both indi-
viduals and corporations and promotes a certain flexibility not found 
in jurisdiction based on the "making" of a contract.75 For example, 
under the present scheme, a contract negotiated or performed in 
whole or in part in Maryland but "made" elsewhere may amount to a 
"transaction of business" in Maryland. 76 The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland illustrated the "transaction of business" concept's flexibil-
ity in jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co.77 by de-
bunking the trial judge's emphasis on where the contract was "made": 
The trial court also concluded that the contract was formed 
in Missouri and was persuaded that this was an important 
factor weighing against the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over appellee: "Well, as far as [appellee was] concerned, the 
contract was negotiated in Missouri .... Well, they never left 
Missouri. Everything they did was in Missouri .... " [W]e view 
the conclusion of the trial judge on where the contract was 
formed far from controlling in the determination of personal 
jurisdiction. 78 
Under an earlier version of the Maryland "Long Arm" Statute, the 
single act of making a contract within Maryland could serve as the 
basis for extraterritorial service of process. Art[icle] 23, [section] 
92(d) of the 1957 edition of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
reads as follows: "[E]very foreign corporation shall be subject to 
suit in this State by a resident of this State or by a person having a 
usual place of business in the State on any cause of action arising out 
of a contract made within this State or liability incurred for acts done 
within this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is doing 
or has done business in this State." ... Under the current version 
of the "Long Arm" Statute [Art. 75, section 96(a)(1),] section 
92(d) was incorporated into [section] 96(a)(1)-the "transaction 
of business" section of the statute-and the revised section "ex-
tends such jurisdiction ... considerably." 
/d. (alteration in original) (quoting, in part, Bernard Auerbach, The "Long 
Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 Mo. L. REv. 13, 34 (1966)). 
73. Maryland follows the lex loci contractus rule, under which the law of the 
place where the contract was "made" governs its meaning and operation, 
and a contract is considered "made" where the last act necessary for the 
formation of a binding contract is performed. Baker v. Sun Co., 985 F. 
Supp. 609, 611 (D. Md. 1997). 
74. Auerbach, supra note 72, at 34. 
75. /d.; see generally Harris v. Arlen Props., Inc., 256 Md. 185, 195, 260 A.2d 22, 
27 (1969) (noting the "more flexible approach" of Maryland's present 
long-arm statute). In the context of this article, the words "form" and 
"make" are synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary defines "make" as, inter alia, 
"to form" and "to execute." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 967 (7th ed. 1999). 
76. Auerbach, supra note 72, at 34. 
77. 94 Md. App. 425, 617 A.2d 1125 (1993). 
78. Jason Pharms., Inc., 94 Md. App. at 432-33, 617 A.2d at 1128-29 (emphasis 
added) (alterations in original); see also Novack v. Nat'l Hot Rod Assoc., 247 
Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967) (describing as "not decisive," for juris-
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Despite that clear guidance by the court of special appeals, the 
Zavian trial judge exalted the importance of where the Personal Man-
agement Agreements were formed: 
[W] hat is apparent to this Court is the fact that the underly-
ing contracts at issue were not formed in Maryland, support-
ing a lack of jurisdiction. Although the facts surrounding 
the formation of the personal representation agreements 
with each of the Defendants are disputed, it is undisputed 
that each of the individual players signed her respective 
agreement outside Maryland, thereby forming the contract 
outside Maryland .... Plaintiff offers several additional argu-
ments in support of the proposition that there were suffi-
cient contacts, including the argument that Plaintiff did 
substantive work in Maryland for the Defendants under her 
representation agreements with each. This Court, however, 
does not find these contacts relevant because they do not 
involve the formation of the agreements between the 
parties.79 
Instead of correcting the trial court's heavy reliance on the "forma-
tion" of the retainer agreements, the Zavian court also stressed, "the 
personal management agreements were neither formed, examined, 
nor executed ... in Maryland."80 Although a contract's place of exe-
cution carried the day under the predecessor long-arm statute,81 sub-
sequentjurisprudence in Maryland and elsewhere has recognized it as 
a "fortuitous circumstance"82 undeserving of weight in a modern juris-
dictional analysis applying the expansive, flexible "transaction of busi-
ness standard."83 
C. New York's Distinctive ''Physical Presence" Requirement 
Unlike Maryland, New York generally requires the defendant's 
physical presence as a sine qua non to exercising long-arm jurisdiction; 






dictional purposes, that defendant's contracts with a Maryland entity were 
"made" in California); City of New York v. Cont'l Vitamin Corp., 254 F. 
Supp. 845, 848 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("The argument in defendant's brief 
devoted to where the contract was 'made' is specious. Even if the contract 
were 'made' outside New York, this factor would not be controlling."). 
Brief for Appellant at 3, Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 
(No. 00074). 
Zavian, 130 Md. App. 689, 702, 747 A.2d 764, 771 (2000). The redundancy 
inherent in its serial use of the words "formed," "examined," and "exe-
cuted" underscored the tribunal's emphasis on where the contracts were 
made. !d. 
See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that the 
place of contract execution was a "purely fortuitous circumstance" and not 
determinative of personal jurisdiction). 
See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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Court has held due process does not require. New York's long-arm 
statute's legislative history indicates that New York courts may subject 
nonresidents to personal jurisdiction only "when they commit acts 
within the state."84 Shortly after the statute's enactment, a commenta-
tor highlighted the issues raised by New York's distinctive "physical 
presence" requirement: 
There is ... little doubt that if the nondomiciliary physically 
comes into New York and commits certain acts there, the 
New York courts will have jurisdiction over him in any action 
arising out of those acts .... However, there are many cases 
in which the nondomiciliary, while committing no physical 
act in New York, still has some connection with that state: 
perhaps he has caused a consequence to be felt there by his 
actions out of state, or perhaps he has entered a contract to 
be performed in New York. In these situations the construc-
tion of the statute will be crucial in determining whether the 
defendant can be forced to answer the plaintiff's complaint 
in New York. If the statute goes to the limits permitted by 
due process, ... then in many of these borderline cases juris-
diction over the nondomiciliary will be upheld .... But if the 
statute is to stop short of due process limitations, many of 
these borderline defendants may escape the in personam ju-
risdiction of the New York courts.85 
As it turned out, in such "borderline" long-arm cases, New York's 
courts adopted a conservative86 approach aptly described as "halfWay 
between Pennoyer and International Shoe':87 although a nonresident de-
84. James T. Ryan, Note, New York Civil Practice and Rules Section 302, 49 CoR-
NELL L.Q. llO, llO (1963) (emphasis added). One commentator observed 
that this limitation "would seem to exclude many situations where the de-
fendant commits an act outside of the state with only the consequences 
occurring in New York." Donald W. Large, Note, Longines-Wittnauer 
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., Feathers v. McLucas, Singer v. 
Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), 51 CoRNELL 
L.Q. 377, 381 (1966). 
85. Large, supra note 84, at 379. Enacted in 1963, the New York statute ana-
lyzed in that article provided: 
[Section] 302. Personal jurisdiction by acts of nondomiciliaries. 
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise 
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or adminis-
trator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumer-
ated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a domiciliary 
of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he: 1. transacts any 
business within the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the 
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character 
arising from the act; or 3. owns, uses or possesses any real property 
situated within the state. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1973). 
86. See supra note 49. 
87. Recent Decision, supra note 48, at 152. The Nonattribution Rule, which in 
a suit by an agent against her nonresident principal, makes the principal's 
18 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 31 
fendant no longer had to be physically present within New York for 
service of process, the courts generally would not find that the nonres-
ident had "transacted business" unless he had physically entered New 
York to further his business objectives.88 
New York's physical presence requirement, which the Nonattribu-
tion Rule exemplifies,89 lacks constitutional origins. According to the 
Supreme Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz,90 so long as a defendant's 
contacts with a forum are not '"random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenu-
ated,"'91 the mere fact that a defendant "did not physically enter the 
forum State" may not defeat in personam jurisdiction in an age when 
substantial amounts of business are transacted solely by non-in-person 
contacts.92 The Court's "modern commercial life"93 rationale has 
"physical presence" a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, 
exemplifies New York's conservative approach to long-arm jurisdiction. !d. 
at 152. 
88. ld. See, e.g., Emmet, Marvin & Martin v. Maybrook, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3105 
(MGC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16753, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990) (deem-
ing services performed by an attorney in New York an insufficient basis for 
jurisdiction where defendant did not come to New York to request plain-
tiff's legal services or undertake any other purposeful activity there); Haar 
v. Armendaris Carp., 294 N.E.2d at 855 (holding that services performed by a 
nonresident attorney in New York, in the absence of in-state acts by the 
client, are an insufficient basis to assert jurisdiction in an action for legal 
fees). New York's particular emphasis on physical presence also finds ex-
pression in that state's distinctive rule that a nonresident's contacts with 
New York by telephone, fax, or mail generally merit little or no weight in a 
jurisdictional analysis. See, e.g., Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 
757, 766 (2d Cir. 1983) ("New York courts have consistently refused to sus-
tain section 302(a) (1) jurisdiction solely on the basis of defendant's com-
munication from another locale with a party in New York."); Prof! Pers. 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Southwest Med. Assoc., Inc., 628 N.Y.S.2d 919, 919 (App. 
Div. 1995) ("Interstate negotiations by telephone, facsimile or mail are in-
sufficient to impose personal jurisdiction in New York upon a non-resident 
defendant."). But see Picard v. Elbaum, 707 F. Supp. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (stating that the maintenance of an investment account in New York 
and telephone calls to New York ordering investment transactions were 
purposeful and continuous transactions of business in New York for juris-
dictional purposes); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 
506, 508 (N.Y. 1970) (stating that participation in a New York auction by 
telephone conferred jurisdiction because the nonresident defendant had 
"projected himself' into New York commerce). An exception to New 
York's physical presence requirement is found in the portion of the Nonat-
tribution Rule that designates a New York agent's in-state acts as attributa-
ble to a nonresident defendant-principal sued by a third party. In such 
cases the nonresident may be sued in New York without ever having set foot 
inside its borders. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra note 87. 
90. 471 u.s. 462 (1985). 
91. !d. at 475 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 
(1984)). 
92. ld. at 476. The Burger King Court observed: 
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely be-
cause the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Al-
though territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential 
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only increased in cogency with the growth of interstate business trans-
acted through Internet, electronic mail, cellular, and fax communica-
tions.94 In harmony with the Supreme Court's approach, Maryland's 
courts have characterized physical presence as inessential to an exer-
cise of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute's "transact[ing] busi-
ness" prong.95 Maryland's and New York's divergence on the physical 
presence issue makes New York long-arm case law readily distinguisha-
ble in Maryland. 
D. The Nonattribution Rule's Flawed Underpinnings 
In Haar v. Armendaris Corp., the New York case that spawned the 




defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable 
foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern com-
mercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted 
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus ob-
viating the need for physical presence within a State in which busi-
ness is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are 
"purposefully directed" toward residents of another State, we have 
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical con-
tacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. 
/d. The Burger King Court approved a Florida federal court's exercise of 
long-arm jurisdiction over a Michigan Burger King franchisee alleged to 
have breached a franchise agreement with a Florida corporation by failing 
to make required payments in Florida. /d. at 487. The Court reasoned that 
the Michigan resident purposefully availed himself of the benefits of Flor-
ida law by entering into a significant, long-term franchise agreement with a 
company headquartered in Florida, and by agreeing that all disputes would 
be governed by Florida law. /d. at 482. 
Id. at 476. 
See Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal jurisdiction for the 
Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 411 (1998) (discussing the diffi-
culty in applying traditional principals of jurisdiction to cyberspace-based 
disputes). 
Sleph v. Radtke, 76 Md. App. 418, 427, 545 A.2d 111, 115, cert. denied, 314 
Md. 193, 550 A.2d 381 (1988) (stating that the requirements of due process 
for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction are satisfied if the suit is based on a 
contract that has a substantial connection with Maryland, even if the defen-
dant has never entered the state). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
not considered the issue of whether "transacting business" requires the de-
fendant's "physical contacts," but in light of (1) the Supreme Court's hold-
ing that due process does not require the defendant's physical presence in 
the forum; and (2) the Court of Appeals of Maryland's frequent pro-
nouncements that the state's long-arm jurisdiction reaches to the full ex-
tent permitted by due process, it appears implausible that Maryland's 
highest court would make physical presence a prerequisite to finding a 
"transaction of business" in Maryland. /d. at 427-29; Snyder v. Hampton 
Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 141 (D. Md. 1981) ("[T]aking the Court of 
Appeals [of Maryland] at its word regarding the constitutional reach of sub-
section (b) (1) [of the Maryland long-arm statute], this court holds that a 
nonresident who has never entered the state, either personally or through 
an agent, may be deemed to have 'transacted business' in the state within 
the meaning of subsection (b) ( 1). "). 
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cern true agency relationships; as such, those cases formed a poor 
foundation for a doctrine turning on agency-based distinctions. In 
addition to its shaky case law underpinnings, the Haar opinion's ex-
treme brevity foreshadowed the conclusory approach taken in Zavian. 
The Zavian court provided no exegesis for its embrace of the 
Nonattribution Rule; instead, the court's conclusory holding read as 
follows: 
In our view, for personal jurisdiction to be exercised over a 
nonresident defendant by attributing an agent's in-state ac-
tivities to the nonresident defendant would offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice. . . . [T] o 
require the nonresident appellees to defend appellant's Ma-
ryland action based solely on appellant's professional ser-
vices rendered in Maryland unilaterally by appellant would, 
in our view, stretch the doctrine of International Shoe beyond 
the limit of due process.96 
1. Haar v. Armendaris Corporation 
Just as the Zavian opinion failed to explain why attributing a plain-
tiff-agent's in-state acts to her nonresident defendant-principal of-
fended due process and traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice, Haar v. Armendaris Corporation,97 the Nonattribution Rule's 
progenitor, also lacked elucidation. Only two paragraphs long, the 
Haar II decision simply reversed the appellate division's decision by 
adopting Judge Capozzoli's dissent in the appellate division's opin-
ion.98 The plaintiff, Charles Haar, who resided in Massachusetts but 
held a New York attorney's license, sued in New York to recover fees 
owed to him by the California-based defendant, Armendaris Corpora-
tion,99 for legal services related to the development of a residential 
community in New York City. 100 Those services included negotiations 
in New York City and a visit to the site of the real property in New 
York. 101 In opposing Armendaris' motion to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, Haar argued that his work performed in New York 
on behalf of Armendaris constituted a transaction of business in New 
York by Armendaris, thereby subjecting the California company to 
New York jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute/02 which 
96. Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 699-700, 747 A.2d 764, 770 (2000). 
97. 294 N.E.2d 855, 855 (N.Y. 1973) [hereinafter Haar IlJ. 
98. /d. 
99. Haar v. Armendaris Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287 (Capozzoli,]., dissenting) 
[hereinafter Haar 1]. The Armendaris Corporation was headquartered in 
California, incorporated in Delaware, and served with process in Missouri. 
/d. 
100. /d. at 286. 
101. /d. at 287 (Capozzoli,]., dissenting). 
102. !d. at 288. 
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provided, in relevant part: "As to a cause of action arising from any of 
the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal ju-
risdiction over any nondomiciliary ... who in person or through an 
agent: 1. transacts any business within the state."103 The Appellate Di-
vision for the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of 
Armedaris' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 104 but 
the New York Court of Appeals reversed, 105 adopting the lower appel-
late court's dissenting opinion, 106 which it paraphrased as follows: 
[A] s in cases, all involving agents suing their principals, in which 
the Court of Appeals had denied jurisdiction, and which 
were cited by it in a footnote in Parke-Bernet Galleries v. 
Franklin, the present plaintiff was relying on his own activi-
ties within the State rather than on defendant's independent 
activities, and that [sic] the record in the present case failed 
to disclose any purposeful activity engaged in by defendant 
itself within the State, out ofwhich plaintiff's action arose, so 
as to render it subject to the court's jurisdiction. 107 
103. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1973); see generally Whitaker v. Fresno Telsat, 
Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 227, 229-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
104. Haar I, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 286. 
105. Harr II, 294 N.E.2d at 855. 
106. !d. 
107. !d. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The actual text of the Judge 
Capozzoli's dissenting opinion read as follows: 
I dissent and would reverse the order appealed from which denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint herein on the ground 
of lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff and defendant are both admittedly nondomiciliaries. On 
June 15, 1971, defendant, in California, wrote to plaintiff, in Massa-
chusetts, allegedly engaging him to "proceed to begin negotiations 
with the Welfare Island Development Corporation toward the exe-
cution of a development agreement." Plaintiff, who now sues for 
services rendered, based upon service on defendant in Missouri, 
failed to submit an affidavit at Special Term in opposition to defen-
dant's motion to dismiss. The only affidavits submitted in opposi-
tion were those of an attorney who claims to have been "engaged as 
associate attorney in this matter by plaintiff' and they alleged in 
conclusory fashion that he and plaintiff had negotiated in New 
York City with the Welfare Island Development Corporation and 
had visited the Welfare Island site here. 
This is not an action between defendant and a third party, but 
rather between plaintiff as agent for defendant and defendant-
principal. In the former situation I would not hesitate to find juris-
diction, but I conclude differently under the facts of this case. This 
precise issue was the subject of a footnote in Parke-Bernet Galleries 
v. Franklyn, which reads as follows: 
2. The present case differs materially from others, relied upon 
by the defendant, in which we have denied jurisdiction. (See 
Glassman v. Hyder; Standard Wine & Liq. Co. v. Bombay Spir-
its Co.; McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp.; Kramer v. 
Vogl.) It is sufficient to point out that in each of those cases, 
all of which involved agents who were suing their principals, 
the plaintiff was relying on his own activities within the State, 
22 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 31 
Thus, New York's highest court established what would later be 
known as the Nonattribution Rule, whereby an agent's acts in New 
York are attributed to his nonresident principal whom a third party 
sues, but such acts are not so attributed if the agent sues the 
principal. 108 
2. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn 
In lieu of offering a rational basis to justifY this dichotomy, the Haar 
II court instead merely cited to a "cryptic"109 footnote in Parke-Bernet 
Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 110 which read as follows: 
The present case differs materially from others, relied upon 
by the defendant, in which we have denied jurisdiction. It is 
sufficient to point out that in each of those cases, all of which 
involved agents who were suing their principals, the plaintiff was 
relying on his own activities within the State, and not those 
of the defendant, as the basis for jurisdiction. In other 
words, in no one of these cases had the defendant himself 
engaged in purposeful activity within the State nor had the 
cause of action arisen out of transactions with third parties 
conducted through an agent. 111 
Upon close scrutiny, the four cases cited in the Parke-Bernet foot-
note112 offer no insight supporting the Nonattribution Rule's agency-
based dichotomy.113 Contrary to the assertion in Parke-Bernet that 
each of the four cases involved "agents who were suing their princi-
pals,"114 in actuality, none of the cases involved true agency relation-









and not those of the defendant, as the basis for jurisdiction. 
In other words, in no one of these cases had the defendant 
himself engaged in purposeful activity within the State nor had 
the cause of action arisen out of transactions with third parties 
conducted through an agent. 
As in the cases in the quoted footnote, the present plaintiff is rely-
ing on his own activities within the State, rather than on defen-
dant's independent activities. This record fails to disclose any 
"purposeful activity" engaged in by defendant itself within this 
State, out of which this action arose, so as to render it subject to 
our jurisdiction in the plaintiff's action against it. 
Haar /, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
Haar II, 294 N.E.2d at 855. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney Supp. 1973-1974) (noting that the "cryptic" 
footnote 2 of the Parke-Bernet opinion "has always confused the writer and is 
now causing consternation in the courts"). 
256 N.E.2d 506, 509 n.2 (N.Y. 1970). 
/d. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
/d.; see also supra note 107 (listing the four cases cited in Parke-Bernet). 
See supra note 51. 
Parke-Bernet, 256 N.E.2d at 509 n.2. 
See infra notes 120-63 and accompanying text; see also supra note 2. 
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turning on agency-based distinctions. What the four cases did exem-
plify was New York's "physical presence" rule: 116 each of the cases de-
nied jurisdiction primarily because the defendant itself never 
physically entered New York and performed a purposeful act from 
which the cause of action arose.U 7 Moreover, two of the four cases 
involved suits against defendants from foreign countries, 118 a scenario 
that considerably raises the bar for personal jurisdiction.U9 As the 
sole ostensible support for New York's formulation of the Nonattribu-
tion Rule, each of the four cases cited in the Parke-Bernet footnote de-
serve careful analysis. 
3. Kramer v. Vogl 
In Kramer v. Vogl, 120 the Court of Appeals of New York considered 
whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over a European defendant 
on the theory that the plaintiff's cause of action arose from the defen-
dant's transaction of business within NewYork. 121 Kramer, a dealer in 
imported leather, received one year's exclusive American purchasing 
rights for the Austrian defendant Vogl's leather goods.122 The plain-
tiff earned neither a salary nor a commission from the defendant, but 
simply "bought the leather and paid for it."123 Thus, contrary to the 
assertion in Parke-Bernet, 124 Kramer did not involve an agency situation 
at all, but rather, a relationship between a seller and an independent 
distributor of goods.125 In alleged violation of Kramer's exclusive 
purchasing rights, Vogl sold its wares to other American leather deal-
ers, and Kramer sued for willful fraud and deceit. 126 According to the 
Kramer court, 
The issue boils down to whether the phrase "transacts any 
business within the state" covers the situation of a nonresi-
dent who never comes into New York State but who sells and 
116. See infra notes 120-63 and accompanying text. 
117. See infra notes 137-80 and accompanying text. 
118. SeeKramerv. Vogl, 215 N.E.2d 159,160 (N.Y. 1966). See infra notes 121-28 
and accompanying text for a discussion of Kramer. See Standard Wine & 
Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 228 N.E.2d 367, 368 (N.Y. 1967). See 
infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of Standard Wine. 
119. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) 
(cautioning that "the Federal Government's interest in its foreign relations 
policies" requires "[g]reat care and reserve" when extending personal juris-
diction over defendants from outside the United States). 
120. 215 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1966). 
121. !d. at 160. 
122. !d. 
123. !d. at 161. 
124. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
125. Kramer, 215 N.E.2d at 161. 
126. !d. at 160. 
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sends goods into the State pursuant to an order sent from 
within the State. 127 
In declining to exercise jurisdiction over the Austrian defendant, 
the Kramer court observed that Vogl: 1) conducted no sales, promo-
tion, or advertising activities in New York; 2) generated only 1% to 2% 
of its total sales from the plaintiff; and 3) offered no evidence that the 
leather it sold to the plaintiff was resold or used in New York.128 
4. Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co. 
On facts very similar to those in Kramer v. Vogl, 129 New York's state 
supreme court also denied jurisdiction in Standard Wine & Liquor Co. 
v. Bombay Spirits Co. 130 In that case, Penrose, a liquor importer and 
distributor, acquired the United States distribution rights to the Scot-
tish defendant's Bombay liquor products. 131 Penrose and Bombay 
then granted the plaintiff, Standard Wine, a liquor distributor, exclu-
sive New York metropolitan area rights for five years to distribute and 
sell Bombay brand gin and vermouth. 132 Subsequendy, in alleged vio-
lation of those exclusive rights, Penrose and Bombay granted distribu-
tion rights to other New York metropolitan area liquor dealers, and 
Standard Wine then sued the Scottish defendant for breach of con-
tract.133 The New York court noted, "Penrose dealt independently of 
Bombay and was not the latter's agent."134 Likewise, it may be reason-
ably inferred that Standard Wine also dealt "independendy" of Bom-
bay and was not its agent. Thus, contrary to the assertion in Parke-
Bernet, 135 Standard Wine did not involve an agency situation at all, but 
rather, as in Kramer, a relationship between a seller and an indepen-
dent distributor of goods.136 In declining to exercise jurisdiction over 
the Scottish distiller, the Standard Wine court observed that, as in 
Kramer, 137 the foreign defendant conducted no in-state "sales, promo-
tion or advertising."138 This scenario stands in "sharp contrast"139 to 
cases sustaining jurisdiction, in which "the foreign corporations sent 
substantial quantities of goods into New York in response to orders 
127. !d. at 161 (emphasis added). 
128. Id. at 161-62. 
129. In each case, the plaintiff sold the products of a non-American defendant, 
the defendant had no physical presence in New York, and the parties 
shared no agency relationship. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying 
text. 
130. 228 N.E.2d 367 (N.Y. 1967). 
131. !d. at 368. 
132. !d. 
133. !d. 
134. !d. at 369 (emphasis added). 
135. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
136. See Standard Wine, 228 N.E.2d at 368. 
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
138. Standard Wine, 228 N.E.2d at 369. 
139. !d. 
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which they had solicited through catalogues and widespread advertis-
ing [in New York] ."140 
5. McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp. 
In McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 141 the Court of Appeals of 
New York again considered whether to exercise jurisdiction over a 
nondomiciliary on the theory that the plaintiff's cause of action arose 
from the defendant's transaction of business within New York. 142 The 
New York-based plaintiff, McKee, a dealer in audio equipment, was 
granted non-exclusive rights to distribute the Chicago-based defen-
dant Rauland-Borg's sound equipment products. 143 Subsequently, a 
disagreement arose between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's custom-
ers, and Rauland-Borg sent its representative to New York to look into 
the difficulties. 144 Thereafter, Rauland-Borg terminated McKee's dis-
tributorship, and McKee sued for breach of contract. 145 The McKee 
Electric court observed that McKee was one of "a number of distribu-
tors, all of whom are independent businessmen selling the sound equip-
ment of other manufacturers as well as thar of Rauland-Borg."146 
Thus, contrary to the assertion in Parke-Bernet, 147 McKee Electric did not 
involve an agency situation at all, but rather, a relationship between a 
seller and an independent distributor of goods. 148 In refusing to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the Illinois defendant, the McKee Electric court 
characterized Rauland-Borg's New York contacts as so "infinitesi-
mal"149 that personal jurisdiction could not be sustained.150 The 
court held that if jurisdiction was exercised under the instant facts, 
then "every corporation whose officers or sales personnel happen to 
pass the time of day with a New York customer in New York runs the 
risk of being subjected to the personal jurisdiction of [New York's) 
courts."151 
140. !d. (contrasting the instant factual scenario with that of Singer v. Walker, 298 
N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1973) where an allegedly improperly manufactured geolo-
gist's hammer caused the loss of an eye). 
141. 229 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1967). 
142. Id. at 605. 
143. ld. 
144. Id. at 606. 
145. Id. 
146. ld. at 605 (emphasis added). 
147. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. 
148. McKee Electric, 229 N.E.2d at 605. 
149. ld. at 607. 
150. Id. 
151. ld. 
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6. Glassman v. Hyder 
In Glassman v. Hyder/52 a New York-licensed real estate salesman, 
Charles Glassman, entered into a broker agreement with three New 
Mexico residents who wanted to sell a building they owned in New 
Mexico.153 Mr. Glassman alleged that, after he found a suitable buyer 
whose offer the New Mexico owners agreed to accept, the owners re-
fused to sign a written contract and failed to pay the agreed commis-
sions.154 The salesman sued to collect his commission; however, the 
New York court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
noting that the broker contract, which was never even reduced to writ-
ing, "was brought about through the initiative of the broker, who tele-
phoned New Mexico and proffered his services"155 to the property 
owners. 156 The property owners "were at no time physically present in 
New York."157 Under the circumstances, and citing A. Millner Co. v. 
Noudar, LDA.,158 the Glassman court held, "[t]he acts of the indepen-
152. 244 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1968). The Glassman case was decided under section 
404 of the New York City Civil Court Act. See Sparks & Co. v. Gallos, 220 
A.2d 673, 674 (NJ. 1966) (noting that, apart from its territorial restrictions, 
section 404 of the New York City Civil Court Act "is identical with New York 
State's 'long arm' statute"). 
153. Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 260. 
154. ld. 
155. Id. at 260, 263 (emphasis added). 
156. ld. at 260 (emphasis added). 
157. Id. (emphasis added). 
158. 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (App. Div. 1966). In Millner, the Portuguese defendant 
had granted the New York plaintiff exclusive rights to market its olives and 
other food products in the United States and Canada. Id. at 292. Under 
the contract, the plaintiff received a three percent commission on all or-
ders it obtained for the defendant. Id. Mter four years, the defendant can-
celled the contract, and the plaintiff sued for breach. Id. at 291-92. In 
declining to exercise long-arm jurisdiction, the Millner court stated: 
The question presented is whether the defendant transacted some 
business in New York with respect to the contract out of which this 
action arises. If the plaintiff were an employee of or an agent act-
ing exclusively for the defendant, plaintiff's acts, in and of them-
selves, performed for the defendant in New York would suffice to 
establish jurisdiction of the action against the defendant. But it is 
asserted and not denied that the plaintiff is an independent broker 
representing many different companies on a commission basis, in 
no way under the defendant's control. In such circumstances the 
acts of the broker representative, the plaintiff herein, are not the 
acts of the so-called principal, and do not create a basis for jurisdic-
tion against this defendant. 
Id. at 292-93 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Millner case thus 
established what one commentator dubbed New York's "exclusive agent" 
rule, whereby if the plaintiff serves as the nonresident defendant's exclusive 
agent in New York, the nonresident is deemed to have transacted business 
in New York, but if the plaintiff represents several companies on a commis-
sion basis, the court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the one com-
pany the. broker representative is suing solely on the grounds of the "so-
called" agency relationship. Recent Decision, supra note 48, at 155 n.38. 
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dent broker within New York should not ... be attributed to the own-
ers so as to become acts of the owners in NewYork."159 Thus, contrary 
to Parke-Bernet's assertion that Glassman involved an agent suing his 
principal, 160 the Glassman court viewed the real estate broker as an 
"independent" party and therefore undeserving of having his in-state 
activities imputed to the New Mexico defendants for jurisdictional 
purposes. 161 In Proctor v. Holden, 162 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland offered persuasive reasoning that supports the Glassman 
court's characterization of the realtor as an independent party, and 
not a true agent: 
One may doubt the realism or good sense of applying tradi-
tional agency law to real estate brokerage. The broker's so-
cial and economic purpose is as an intermediary, bringing 
seller and buyer together and perhaps making both give a 
little bit in the process, for their own good. He has a sense of 
obligation to both, if he is conscientious, yet he really is a 
self-dealer, seeking monetary reward for fulfilling his useful 
social and economic role. 163 
IV. CRITICISM OF ZAVIAN v. FOVDY 
A. Distinguishing Zavian from Haar 
Haar v. Armendaris164 presented a far weaker case for personal juris-
diction than did Zavian v. Foudy165 because in Haar, both parties were 
nonresidents,166 a scenario not invoking the forum's "rightful interest 
and legitimate power" to provide a venue for the redress of wrongs to 
its citizens. One may distinguish the facts in Haar from those in 
Zavian because in Zavian, the plaintiff was a domiciliary of the forum 
state. 167 Although the Zavian court overlooked this important distinc-
tion, the United States Supreme Court/68 the Fourth Circuit Court of 
159. Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 263 (emphasis added). 
160. See supra notes llO-ll and accompanying text. 
161. Glassman, 244 N.E.2d at 263. 
162. 75 Md. App. 1, 540 A.2d 133 (1988). 
163. Id. at 17, 540 A.2d at 141 (quoting W.B. Raushenbush, Problems and Practices 
with Financing Conditions in Real Estate Purchase Contracts, 1963 Wrs. L. REv. 
566, 594 (1963)). 
164. 337 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1972), rev'd, 294 N.E.2d 855 (N.Y. 1973) (re-
versing the Appellate Division's decision based on the dissent in the Appel-
late Division's opinion). 
165. 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 (2000). 
166. Haar I, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting). 
167. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766. 
168. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) 
(holding that the plaintiff's nonresidency diminished California's interest 
in exercising long-arm jurisdiction); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 4 71 
U.S. 462, 473 (1985) ("A State generally has a 'manifest interest' in provid-
ing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by 
out-of-state actors."). 
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Appeals/ 69 and New Yorkjurists170 have emphasized the significance 
of the plaintiff's forum residency vel non. A plaintiff's residency in the 
forum weighs in favor of jurisdiction because it invokes that state's 
manifest and legitimate interest to ensure the economic health of its 
citizens by providing them with a convenient forum to redress wrongs 
inflicted by out-of-state actors. 171 Conversely, a plaintiff's nonresi-
dency fails to invoke such interests and therefore diminishes the 
state's rightful interest in exercising long-armjurisdiction. 172 In Haar, 
the plaintiff's nondomiciliary status failed to implicate the state's in-
terest in providing its residents a forum in which to sue, 173 but in 
Zavian, the plaintiff's Maryland citizenship did implicate that inter-
est. 174 Unlike other courts, 175 the Zavian court neglected to recognize 
that this important distinction weighed in favor of its exercising juris-
diction and rendered Haar an inapt precedent.176 
B. Mischaracterizing Legal Services as "Unilateral Activity" 
The Zavian court misapplied Supreme Court and Maryland prece-
dent by dismissing the Maryland attorney's services as unilateral activity 
despite the clearly bilateral nature of the parties' attorney-client rela-
tionship, and by disregarding the defendants' purposeful and re-
peated business-related appearances in Maryland. 
In Hanson v. Denckla, 177 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's 
"unilateral activity"178 cannot satisfY due process;179 rather, the "mini-
169. Ellicott Mach. Corp. v.John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 
1993). Applying Maryland law, the court held that "Maryland, of course, 
has an interest in adjudicating the action insofar as it seeks to ensure the 
economic health of its citizens and the fair resolution of their disputes." /d. 
170. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Carroll, 687 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (N.Y. 1997) (Bellacosa, 
J., dissenting) ("New York has its own rightful interest and legitimate power 
to protect and to provide judicial access here for the redress of wrongs to its 
residents and citizens."). 
171. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
172. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 114 (noting that plaintiffs nonresi-
dency diminished California's interest in exercising long-armjurisdiction). 
173. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
175. See Savitz v. Zim Chern. Co., 364 N.Y.S.2d 661,664 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (exercis-
ing long-arm jurisdiction and distinguishing "the facts set forth in Haar v. 
Armendaris Corp ... from the facts in the instant case in that in Haar the 
parties were both nondomiciliaries of the State of New York"); Carro, 
Spanbock, Kaster, & Cuiffo v. Rinzler, No. 88 Civ. 5280 (MJL), 1991 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1212, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (exercising long-arm jurisdiction 
and rejecting the defendants' reliance on Harr as "misplaced" because, un-
like the instant case, in Haar the parties were both nondomiciliaries of New 
York). 
176. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
177. 357 u.s. 235 (1958). 
178. /d. at 253. 
179. /d. 
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mal contacts"180 required by due process are not met unless the non-
resident defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws."181 Applying that standard, the Hanson 
Court invalidated Florida's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a 
Delaware trust company because the only connections between the 
nonresident defendant and the State of Florida were those initiated by 
and for the benefit of the plaintiff. 182 In other words, the Delaware 
company had committed no volitional act bearing a connection to the 
forum or a resident of the forum; thus, the only contacts with the 
forum were those created by the settlor's unilateral decision to relo-
cate to Florida and exercise her power of appointment there. 183 Han-
son distinguished McGee v. International Life Insurance, Co., 184 where the 
nonresident defendant had, for its own benefit, initiated connections 
180. !d. at 251. 
181. !d. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
182. !d. at 252. The Court of Appeals of Maryland skillfully summarized Han-
son's convoluted facts in Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 
( 1976), stating: 
The cause of action in Hanson arose out of a trust settled in Dela-
ware and concerned the effectiveness of the exercise of a power of 
appointment in Florida. At the time of execution of the deed of 
trust in Delaware, the settlor was a Pennsylvania domiciliary and 
the trustee was a Delaware bank. Subsequently the settlor moved 
to Florida where she attempted to exercise the power of appoint-
ment in question. After the death of the settlor, a Florida court, in 
a proceeding in which the Delaware trustee did not appear, held 
that the trust, and therefore the power of appointment, was invalid 
under Florida law. When a Delaware court refused to give full faith 
and credit to the Florida court's decree, the jurisdiction of the Flor-
ida court over the Delaware trust company became the issue. 
The Court held that the contacts of the Delaware trust company 
with Florida were insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion by the Florida courts. The trust company was neither present, 
nor did it transact any business in Florida. Moreover, this was not a 
case, said the Court, like McGee where the cause of action arose out 
of a transaction having a substantial connection with the forum. 
The cause of action in Hanson, according to the Court, arose out of 
the Delaware trust agreement, which, when entered into, had no 
connection with the Florida forum. It was only years later that 
there arose any connection between the trust agreement and the 
State of Florida, after the settlor moved there and initiated several 
"bits" of trust administration from Florida while receiving periodic 
payments from the trust company of trust income; it was also in 
Florida, of course, that the settlor executed the power of appoint-
ment in question. These connections between the trust agree-
ment, the transaction out of which the cause of action arose, and 
the forum, because of their nature and quality, were found to lack 
the substantiality necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
Delaware trust company. 
!d. at 228-29, 352 A.2d at 823-24. 
183. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
184. 355 u.s. 220 (1957). 
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with the forum by soliciting an insurance contract with a California 
resident. 185 The Supreme Court thus drew a distinction whereby a 
plaintiffs initiation of forum contacts weighs against an exercise of ju-
risdiction, but a defendant's initiation of forum contacts by, for exam-
ple, initiating a contractual relationship with a forum resident, weighs 
in favor of jurisdiction.186 The "purposeful availment" requirement 
established in Hanson became an integral part of the minimum con-
tacts analysis. 
In Zavian, the court mischaracterized the Maryland attorney's legal 
services when it termed them, "as the Supreme Court [in Hanson] put 
it, 'unilateral activity."' 187 To the contrary, the soccer players, to fur-
ther their own business aims, initiated contact with the Maryland law-
yer when each "individually contacted"188 Ms. Zavian and "proposed 
that she act as their agent," 189 thereby inaugurating bilateral contrac-
tual ties that would obligate them to send payment into Maryland for 
services to be performed in Maryland by a Maryland resident. 190 The 
Zavian court justified its characterization of the lawyer's services as 
"unilateral activity" by asserting, "[a]lthough the appellees contacted 
appellant to obtain her professional services, it was because her name 
appeared on a list of lawyers willing to perform such services for fe-
male athletes and not because she was a Maryland lawyer."191 In giv-
ing the defendants' purposeful initiation of the business relationship 
little weight, 192 the Zavian court failed to view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, 193 and ignored an important 
185. /d. at 221. In McGee, the Supreme Court ruled that a nonresident's single 
act of soliciting an insurance contract with a resident of the forum state was 
enough to confer jurisdiction because of the forum's interest in providing 
effective redress for its resident when a nonresident refuses to pay pursuant 
to a contractual relationship initiated by the nonresident. /d. at 223. In 
reviewing developments since Pennayer, the McGee Court noted: 
[A] trend is clearly discernable toward expanding the permissible 
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-
residents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transfor-
mation of our national economy over the years. Today many 
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve 
parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nation-
alization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of 
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time 
modern transportation and communication have made it much 
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State 
where he engages in economic activity. 
/d. at 222-23. 
186. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252. 
187. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 700, 747 A.2d at 770-71 (emphasis added). 
188. /d. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766. 
189. /d. 
190. /d. at 692, 747 A.2d at 766. 
191. /d. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771. 
192. /d. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771. 
193. Zavian was a groundbreaking case not only for its adoption of the Nonat-
tribution Rule, but also because, for the first time, a Maryland state appel-
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advisement from the court of appeals: "The Hanson principle does not 
mandate an inquiry into motive; it is sufficient that, for whatever reason, 
the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities in the forum." 194 
The Zavian court also gave little weight to the defendant soccer 
players' repeated appearances in Maryland to "'personally conduct 
business, perform, play, train, conduct meetings, and attend promo-
tional appearances.">I95 Of these contacts, the court said: "Unfortu-
nately for appellant, appellees' only contacts with Maryland are 
because they are members of the [United States Women's Soccer] 
Team .... In other words, the appellees appear wherever the Team's 
schedule takes them, be it Maryland or Timbuktu."196 Once again, 
the Zavian court failed to heed Geelhoed's mandate that a nonresi-
dent's purposeful activities in Maryland, conducted ''for whatever rea-
son," merit due consideration in a jurisdictional analysis. 197 Under 
Geelhoed's interpretation of Hanson, it is irrelevant that the soccer play-
ers' repeated appearances to conduct purposeful activities in Mary-
land were required by their status as Team members. 198 On facts 
analogous to those in Zavian, in Geelhoed the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land upheldjurisdiction after rejecting the defendant's assertion that 
his temporary "presence in Maryland was not voluntary because he 
was required to work in the State by the Public Health Service in con-
nection with his Selective Service obligation."199 
late court held that a court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction must consider the facts in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771-72. 
Specifically, the Zavian opinion stated: 
Lastly, appellant contends it was reversible error for the trial court 
to grant appellees' Motion to Dismiss without considering evidence 
in the light most favorable to appellant. It was error for the trial court 
to say there were "simply too many disputed facts surrounding this 
matter to support a finding of jurisdiction given that the support-
ing affidavits are atodds," but it was harmless error. Had the trial 
court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to appellant, the 
result would have been the same. 
/d. (emphasis added). Cf Mun. Mortgage & Equity, LLC v. Southfork 
Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 93 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Md. 2000) (quoting 
Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)) ("In considering a 
challenge to personal jurisdiction, 'the court must construe all relevant 
pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume 
credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of 
jurisdiction.'"). 
194. Geelhoed v.Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 231, 352 A.2d 818, 825 (1976) (emphasis 
added). 
195. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771. 
196. /d. 
197. Geelhoed, 277 Md. at 231, 352 A.2d at 825. 
198. See id. 
199. /d. at 230-31, 352 A.2d at 824-25. 
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C. Initiation of the Attorney-Client Relationship 
The Zavian court should have assigned weight in its jurisdictional 
analysis to the nonresident defendants' initiation of the parties' attor-
ney-client relationship. In assessing the sufficiency of a nonresident's 
contacts with the forum state, the "constitutional touchstone"200 is 
whether the contacts were "purposefully established"201 by the defen-
dant such that he "will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result 
of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts."202 Amplifying on Han-
son's "purposeful availment" doctrine,203 the Supreme Court in Burger 
King articulated a dichotomy whereby contacts with the forum state 
that are "purposefully established"204 by the defendant weigh in favor 
of jurisdiction, but those that are '"random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenu-
ated'" do not.205 Although the Zavian court failed to cite Burger 
King,206 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland implicitly (and in-
correctly) found that the "constitutional touchstone"207 of purposeful 
contact with the forum state was not met. 208 Despite acknowledging 
that the defendant soccer players initiated the business relationship 
with their Maryland attorney,209 the Zavian opinion incongruously as-
serted that the defendant soccer players "did not purposely seek a Mary-
land agent"210 and "did not purposely engage in adequate activities in 
Maryland."211 To the contrary, what acts of a defendant could be 
more "purposeful" than the soccer players' selecting, soliciting, and 
retaining Ms. Zavian, a Maryland attorney, to represent them in sub-
stantial business transactions?212 A nonresident's purposeful, deliber-














Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
!d. 
Id. at 475 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
Burger King, 357 U.S. at 474. 
ld. at 475 (citations omitted). 
See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the signif-
icance of Burger King. 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. 
Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771. 
ld. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771. 
Id. at 702, 747 A.2d at 771 (emphasis added). 
!d. (emphasis added). 
See Cramer v. Lupka, No. D.N. CV91 0120228 S, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
878, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1992) (noting that the nonresident's 
hiring of a Connecticut attorney to perform legal services in Connecticut 
"constitutes a single purposeful business transaction sufficient to impose 
jurisdiction under our Long Arm Statute"); Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 
988, 997 (D.C. 1981) (noting that hiring an attorney, "far from being fortui-
tous or accidental," created a contact with the attorney's forum that was 
"deliberate and voluntary"); see generally Nueva Eng'g, Inc. v. Accurate Elec., 
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 953, 954-55 (D. Md. 1986) ("Entering into a contract is 
always 'purposeful' in some way, and commercial transactions with a forum 
plaintiff always implicate the benefits and protections of the forum's laws to 
some extent."). 
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relationship may readily be distinguished from factual scenarios prop-
erly characterized as '"random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated. "'213 Ex-
amples of cases falling within the latter category include World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 214 Kulko v. California Superior Court,215 and 
Hanson v. Denckla.216 In each of those cases, the nonresident defen-
dant did not participate in the act establishing contacts with the fo-
rum; rather, the unilateral and fortuitous act of the plaintiff created the 
forum contacts.217 On the other hand, establishing an interstate attor-
ney-client relationship, such as present in Zavian,218 inherently re-
quires the bilateral and purposeful assent of both the attorney and the 
nonresident client. When the nonresident initiates the relationship, 
as in Zavian,219 the case for extraterritorial jurisdiction grows even 
stronger.220 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland ele-
vated the initiation factor in Potomac Design, Inc. v. Eurocal Trading, 
Inc.,221 observing that "a determination of whether the defendant ini-
tiated the business relationship in some way" has been viewed as the 
"strongest factor" or even a "dispositive" factor when deciding the pro-
priety of exercising long-arm jurisdiction. 222 As in Maryland, courts in 
New York223 and elsewhere224 have recognized the materiality of who 
213. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. 
214. 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that due process forbids the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over an out-of-state automobile distributor whose only tie 
to the forum resulted from a customer's decision to drive there). 
215. 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (holding that due process forbids exercising personal 
jurisdiction over a divorced husband sued for child-support payments 
whose only affiliation with the forum was created by his former spouse's 
decision to live there). 
216. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that due process forbids exercisingjurisdic-
tion over a trustee whose only connection with the forum resulted from the 
settlor's decision to exercise her power of appointment there). 
217. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
218. 130 Md. App. at 691, 747 A.2d at 766. 
219. /d. 
220. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text. 
221. 839 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1993). 
222. /d. at 370. The Potomac Design court observed: 
"[T]he courts have considered various factors in the contract situa-
tion, including whether the parties contemplated that the work 
would be performed, where payment was made, etc. The strongest 
factor that seems to have emerged, however, is a determination of 
whether the defendant initiated the business relationship in some 
way .... The Fourth Circuit also seems to have adopted the deter-
mination of whether the defendant initiated the business relation-
ship in some way as a dispositive factor .... " 
/d. (alterations in original) (quoting NuevaEng'g, Inc., 628 F. Supp. at 955). 
223. See Williams v. Nathan, 897 F. Supp. 72, 76 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that 
the fact that plaintiff initiated contacts with defendant "weighs against a 
finding that this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant") citing 
Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. W. Oil & Refining Co., 708 F. Supp. 86, 88-89 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
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initiated the business relationship. Although the Zavian court ac-
knowledged that the soccer players initiated their attorney-client rela-
tionship with Ms. Zavian,225 the court of special appeals went against 
the weight of authority in according that fact no weight in its jurisdic-
tional analysis. 
D. Analyzing Asahi 's Reasonableness Factors 
The Zavian court failed to consider any of the five "reasonableness" 
factors identified by the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry v. Supe-
rior Court of California; if it had, it would have found that each of the 
four relevant factors weighed in favor of Maryland's exercise of juris-
diction. In Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court of California,226 the 
Supreme Court set forth five factors that a court "must consider"227 to 
determine the "reasonableness"228 of the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: 1) "the burden on the defendant;" 2) "the interests of the 
forum State;" 3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief;" 4) "'the 
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient reso-
lution of controversies;"' and 5) "'the shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.' "229 The 
Zavian court considered none of these factors. 230 If it had, it would 
have found that four of the factors weighed in favor of exercising juris-
diction over the nonresident soccer players, and that the fifth factor 
was inapplicable. First, whereas the Zavian defendants' vocation re-
quired frequent interstate travel to locations including Maryland,231 
and two of the three defendants resided in relatively nearby eastern 
seaboard states, 232 the burden on them to defend a suit in Maryland 
would have been relatively slight. Second, Maryland had a strong in-
terest in providing Ms. Zavian, a Maryland citizen, a forum to enforce 
her contractual rights, which, according to the Personal Management 
224. See, e.g., Ideal Ins. Agency v. Shipyard Marine, Inc., 572 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) ("The initiation of a transaction is an important factor in 
determining whether a defendant transacted business in lthe] State."). 
225. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771. 
226. 480 u.s. 102 (1987). 
227. !d. at 113. 
228. !d. If the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is "reasonable" under the 
Asahi factors, it will not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."' !d. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316). 
229. !d. at 113 (citations omitted); see also infra note 236. 
230. See generally Zavian, 130 Md. App. 689, '747 A.2d 764. 
231. !d. at 701, 747 A.2d at 771. 
232. Julie Foudy, Carla Overbeck, and Kristine Lilly resided in California, North 
Carolina, and Connecticut, respectively. !d. at 691-92, 747 A.2d at 766. 
Compare Nueva Eng'g, Inc. v. Accurate Elec., Inc., 628 F. Supp. 953, 957 (D. 
Md. 1986) (taking 'judicial notice of the fact that Connecticut and Mary-
land are not very far apart in the modem world") with Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 
(the "unique burdens" on the Japanese defendant would have been "se-
vere" because of the great distance between Japan and California, and the 
disadvantages of litigating in a foreign country's judicial system). 
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Agreements, were to be enforced according to the laws of Mary-
land.233 The Zavian opinion failed to mention this important fact. 234 
Third, Ms. Zavian had a strong interest in avoiding the inconvenience 
of litigating her common-issue claims in three different states. 235 
Fourth, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies should have weighed heavily in 
favor of Maryland's exercising jurisdiction over the common issues in-
stead of separately adjudicating the same issues three times over in the 
courts of California, Connecticut, and North Carolina.236 
E. The Zavian Court's Refusal to Acknowledge Precedents from Fourteen 
Other jurisdictions 
The Zavian opinion's survey of on-point cases painted an incom-
plete picture because it neglected to cite any of the court decisions 
from fourteen jurisdictions exercising judicial authority over a nonres-
ident client sued by their attorney for unpaid legal fees. 
In support of its adoption of the Nonattribution Rule, 237 the Zavian 
court cited cases from only two states, New York and Illinois.238 Both 
states belong to the small minority of seven states that interpret their 
long-arm statutes as not extending personal jurisdiction to the full ex-
tent constitutionally permissible.239 Further, Zavian acknowledged 
only one case supporting the contrary position, i.e., supporting attri-
bution, for jurisdictional purposes, of a plaintiff-agent's in-state acts to 
233. 
234. 
Brief for Appellant at 2, Zavian v. Foudy, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764 
(2000) (No. 00074). 
See generally Zavian, 130 Md. App. 689, 747 A.2d 764. Cf Asahi, 480 U.S. at 
114 (stating that California's interest in exercisingjurisdiction was "slight" 
because both parties were nonresidents, and because it was doubtful that 
California law would govern the dispute); Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 482 
("Nothing in our cases ... suggests that a choice-of-law provision should be 
ignored in considering whether a defendant has 'purposefully invoked the 
benefits and protections of a State's laws' for jurisdictional purposes."). 
235. Cf Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (stating that it was no more convenient for the 
Japanese plaintiff to litigate in California than in Taiwan or Japan). 
236. Asahi's fifth "reasonableness" factor, "the advancement of substantive poli-
cies," was not implicated by the Zavian facts. !d. at 115 (stating that the 
Supreme Court cautioned that "the Federal Government's interest in its 




tending personal jurisdiction over alien defendants). 
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
See, e.g., Emmet, Marvin & Martin v. Maybrook, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 3105 
(MGC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16753, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1990) (deem-
ing services performed by an attorney in New York an insufficient basis for 
jurisdiction where defendant did not come to New York to request plain-
tiff's legal services or undertake any other purposeful activity there);Jacob-
son v. Stram, No. 80 C 1228, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15437, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 29, 1980) ("An attorney's mere performance of professional services in 
Illinois on behalf of an out-of-state client is not sufficient to subject the 
foreign party to in personam jurisdiction in Illinois."). 
See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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a nonresident defendant-principal.240 Unfortunately, the Zavian 
court's survey of on-point cases painted an incomplete picture of the 
relevant jurisprudence.241 In fact, precedents in fourteen jurisdic-
tions have upheld the forum's exercise of extraterritorial personal ju-
risdiction when an in-state lawyer sues a nonresident client to collect a 
fee. 242 On the other hand, until Zavian, only courts in the non-full-
240. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 698-99, 747 A.2d at 769-70. The Zavian opinion 
cited Snyder v. Hampton Industries, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (D. Md. 
1981), discussed supra in notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
241. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 696-98, 747 A.2d at 768-69. 
242. See Fly, Shuebruk, Gaguine, Boros & Braun v. Marcus, No. 94 Civ. 543 
(KTD), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2910, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1996) (holding 
that New York's long-arm statute was satisfied where New York law firm's 
contract to provide legal services to the nonresident defendant "was en-
tered into and largely performed in New York and ... the defendant re-
peatedly met with the plaintiff in New York"); Robins, Kaplan, Miller & 
Ciresi v. Senoret Chern. Co., No. 4-90-317, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19852, at 
*2, *8 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that Missouri defendant, which 
retained Minnesota law firm to perform legal services, was subject to Min-
nesota's personal jurisdiction in suit for unpaid fees); Schwartz & Assocs. v. 
Elite Line, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that in a 
suit by a Missouri attorney to recover legal fees owed by California defend-
ants, Missouri's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction comported with due pro-
cess because "[d]efendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits 
of the forum by initiating contact" with plaintiff); Jenner & Block v. Land 
Paving Co., No. 85 C 07552, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28769, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 27, 1986) (holding that in an action for payment of attorney fees owed 
to an Illinois law firm, the Illinois long-arm statute and due process were 
satisfied because the Nebraska defendant "knew or should have known that 
the Illinois plaintiff would perform its contractual obligations in Illinois 
and could reasonably foresee that its conduct and connection with Illinois 
was such that they could anticipate being brought into court in Illinois"); 
Law Offices ofjerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast Sys., Ltd., 630 F. Supp. 1311, 
1313 (D.D.C. 1986) (exercising long-arm jurisdiction over New York re-
sidents who retained District of Columbia lawyers and noting that "many 
courts, including the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, have found 
that defendants who sought legal counsel within a forum may be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in that forum for failure to pay legal fees"); 
O'Connor, Cavanaugh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A. 
v. Bonus Utah, Inc., 750 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that plaintiff, a Utah corporation, subjected itself to Arizona's long-arm ju-
risdiction by contracting with an Arizona attorney for legal services to be 
performed in Arizona); Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease v. Ryan, 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 858, 859 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a California resident who had 
"hired an Ohio law firm to do legal work in Ohio" had committed to a 
"contract for legal services [that] was sufficiently connected with Ohio so 
that Ohio's exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable"); Cramer v. 
Lupka, No. DN CV91 0120228S, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 878, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1992) (holding that a nonresident's hiring of a 
Connecticut attorney to perform legal services in Connecticut "constitutes a 
single purposeful business transaction sufficient to impose jurisdiction 
under our Long Arm Statute"); Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 997 
(D.C. 1981) (noting that Florida appellees who solicited District of Colum-
bia attorney to perform work primarily in the District "transacted business" 
within the meaning of the long-arm statute: "[F]ar from being fortuitous or 
accidental, appellees' contacts were deliberate and voluntary as evidenced 
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extent243 states of New York and Illinois had denied jurisdiction under 
such facts. 244 
V. CONCLUSION 
In light of the court of special appeals' decision in Zavian v. 
Foudy,245 a practitioner may ask: are federal courts applying Maryland 
law bound to apply the Nonattribution Rule,246 do they remain free to 
reject it, as the district court did in Snyder,247 or does the real answer 
lie somewhere in between? The Zavian court made its view clear: 
"Federal district courts ... are bound by the decisions of the Maryland 
Courts of Appeal interpreting Maryland law."248 However, in Craig v. 
by the communications between appellees and appellant in the District, 
which appellees had initiated in the first instance"); Bordelon, Hamlin, 
Theriot & Hardy v. Burlington Broad., Ltd., 652 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (La. Ct. 
App. 1995) (upholding long-arm jurisdiction over an Iowa defendant sued 
for legal fees despite the fact that he "never physically entered Louisiana;" 
factors weighing in favor of personal jurisdiction included defendant's initi-
ation of contact with the plaintiff, the fact that the engagement letter was 
drafted in Louisiana, and "numerous telephone calls, facsimiles and mail-
ings to and from Louisiana" during the six months oflegal representation); 
Phillips v. Rhode Island, No. 94-5112-G, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 460, at *9 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1995) (holding that a Rhode Island defendant, 
sued by a Massachusetts law firm for unpaid fees, was subject to Massachu-
setts' long-arm jurisdiction because it "affirmatively sought out counsel in 
Massachusetts and entered into a contract with a Massachusetts partner-
ship" with whom it "then remained in continual telephonic and written 
contact ... for over three years"); Alan B. McPheron, Inc. v. Koning, 336 
N.W.2d 474,477,478 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding enforcement of an 
Oklahoma judgment against a Michigan resident, rendered pursuant to 
Oklahoma's long-arm statute, because "defendant made the initial contact 
seeking legal services to be rendered in Oklahoma"); Wilson & Reitman v. 
Berick, No. 59884, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 474, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 
1992) (upholding enforcement of a California judgment against an Ohio 
resident, rendered pursuant to California's exercise of extraterritorial per-
sonal jurisdiction, because the Ohio resident had "availed himself of the 
privileges of conducting business in the state of California" by hiring a Cali-
fornia Jaw firm to provide legal services in California for his son); O'Brien 
v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Tex. 1966) (holding that an Illinois 
judgment secured by an Illinois attorney through long-arm jurisdiction 
over a Texas client was enforceable in Texas); Toulouse v. Swanson, 438 
P.2d 578, 580 (Wash. 1968) (holding that in a suit for unpaid legal fees, 
propriety of Washington's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over Idaho resi-
dent was "undebatable" because "[i]t is beyond dispute that defendant con-
summated a transaction in this state when he employed plaintiff as his 
lawyer"). 
243. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra note 238. 
245. 130 Md. App. 689, 702, 747 A.2d 764, 771 (2000). 
246. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
247. Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (D. Md. 1981); see 
also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. 
248. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 698 n.2, 747 A.2d at 769 n.2 (emphasis added). 
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General Finance Corp.,249 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland mentioned only Maryland's highest court, when it 
stated that "[t]his court is bound by the decisions of the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland as to whether a particular subsection [of the long-
arm statute] will reach certain conduct."250 The Supreme Court 
struck a middle ground in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of 
Bosch, 251 advising: 
[W] hile the decrees of "lower state courts" should be "attrib-
uted some weight ... the decision [is] not controlling ... " 
where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the 
point. [Moreover,] "an intermediate appellate state court 
... is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other 
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide 
otherwise. "252 
Given the conflicting decisions of Maryland's federal district 
court253 and the State's intermediate appellate court,254 the Court of 
Appeals ofMaryland may, if presented with the opportunity, choose to 
reassess whether the Nonattribution Rule255 accords with Maryland's 
historical commitment to extend its long-arm jurisdiction to the full 
extent permitted by due process.256 Until then, Maryland's bench 
and bar will harbor uncertainty as to which applies in federal court: 
the Snyder court's257 rejection of the Nonattribution Rule,258 or the 
Zavian court's259 adoption of it. 
Personal jurisdiction controversies evoke the wisdom expressed by 
Supreme CourtJustice Oliver Wendell Holmesjr.:260 "I long have said 
there is no such thing as a hard case. I am frightened weekly, but 
always when you walk up to the lion and lay hold the hide comes off 
and the same old donkey of a question of law is undemeath."261 In 
249. 504 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1980). 
250. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added). 
251. 387 u.s. 456 (1967). 
252. Id. at 465 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). 
253. Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 141-42 (rejecting the Nonattribution Rule). 
254. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770 (embracing the Nonattribu-
tion Rule). 
255. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
257. Snyder, 521 F. Supp. at 141-42. 
258. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
259. Zavian, 130 Md. App. at 699, 747 A.2d at 770. 
260. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., known as "The Great Dissenter," served 
with distinction on the United States Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932. 
SeeTHE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR. 3 (Robert W. Gardner ed., 
Stanford Univ. Press 1992). 
261. Young v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 108 Md. App. 233, 235, 671 A.2d 515, 
516 (1996) (quoting 1 HoLMEs-PoLLOCK LETrERS: THE CoRREsPONDENCE OF 
MR. JusTICE HoLMES AND SIR FREDERICK PoLLOCK 1874-1932, 156 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., Rothman & Co. 1994)). 
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cases like Zavian, the "old donkey" concerns whether a nonresident's 
Maryland contacts justify the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under Maryland's long-arm statute and the analytical roadmap of In-
ternational Shorl-62 and its progeny. In such cases, Maryland's interest 
in providing its citizens a convenient forum to redress wrongs inflicted 
by nonresidents263 should prevail over those using due process as a 
stalking horse to avoid their voluntarily assumed interstate 
obligations. 264 
262. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. 
264. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
